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“It is hardly necessary to point out 
that  competition  of  the  kind  we 
have  now  in  mind  acts  not  only 
when in being but also when it is 
merely  an  ever-present  threat.  It 
disciplines before it attacks.” 
(Schumpeter, 1943, p. 85)  
1: Introduction
1 
Comparisons by countries and by sectors of mergers and acquisitions (M&A) have 
usually  been  performed  in  separate  fields  of  research
2.  A  first  group  of  studies, 
focusing on international comparisons, has explored the role of corporate governance 
systems, investor protection laws and other countries’ regulatory institutions as the 
main determinants of takeovers around the world (see, for instance, Rossi and Volpin, 
2004). The underlying claim of these studies is that, in better-regulated systems, it is 
easier and less expensive to raise capital and to finance corporate acquisitions. 
A  second  group of  contributions (Andrade  et. 2001, Mitchell  and Mulherin,  1996; 
Jovanovic  and  Rousseau,  2001,  2002)  has  attributed a  central role to variations  in 
industry composition, documenting that, in each country, mergers occur in waves and 
within each wave clustering by industry is observed. In this field of research, industry-
level  shocks  (due  to  technological  and  regulatory  changes)  play  a  central  role  in 
explaining takeovers and their evolution in time. 
This paper aims to integrate both perspectives and to make comparisons by countries 
and by sectors, thus exploring the role of various driving forces on takeover activities. 
The hypothesis to be tested is the following: economies with higher investor protection 
are more financially developed and have more liquid stock markets. Thus, “they can 
discipline poor management and restructure failing companies more easily than can 
economies that do not have these means at their disposal” (Jovanovic Rousseau, 2001, 
p. 28). This need may come to the fore when shocks occur and poorly managed firms 
fail to react.  
We also intend to consider the specific influence that technological regimes and their 
innovation patterns may exert in reallocating assets and moving capital among sectors. 
                                                
1We wish to thank Slavo Radosevic for his valuable suggestions to a preceding version 
of  this  paper,  presented  at  the  European  Association  for  Comparative  Economic 
Studies 9
th Conference, Brighton, UK, 7-9 September 2006. We also received helpful 
comments from Paolo Polinori. Naturally, all errors and imperfections are our own. 
 
2One exception is the study by Martynova and Renneboog (2006), in which comparisons by 
countries and by sectors are performed in the European context for the period 1993-2001.   3
Thus, the main contribution intends to be a multidimensional analysis in which both 
technological factors and institutional and sectoral determinants are integrated in a 
unified perspective. Indeed, as we show below, our empirical strategy is to analyze the 
frequency of merger transactions at a sectoral level, controlling for the roles of country 
and institutional variables and focussing on those sectoral disparities associated with 
distinct technological regimes.  
As  recently  emphasized  by  Cassiman  and  Colombo  (2006a,  p.  1),  mergers  and 
innovation “are a central piece of today’s competitive strategy development” and the 
integration  between  these  two  issues  may  offer  a  key  contribution.  One  potential 
implication is that the main differences that characterise sectors in terms of innovation 
and which determine the existence of two distinct regimes, the entrepreneurial and 
routinised sectors, may have an effect on their merger experiences.  
In the first regime, also called Schumpeter Mark I, innovation is radical, investment 
projects are short-lived, capital depreciation is rapid and knowledge and competences 
are  general;  thus,  for  this  regime,  one  can  expect  mergers  and  acquisitions  to  be 
frequent and that they may be an efficient way to grow and obtain synergies in R&D 
expenditure. The opposite may be true for the other, routinised regime, also known as 
Schumpeter  Mark  II,  in  which  innovations  are  incremental  along  the  existing 
technological trajectory, investments are long-term oriented and human capital and 
skills are firm-specific. (Malerba and Orsenigo, 1996)
3. In this context, one can expect 
less frequent reallocations by the acquisition of other firms. 
Thus,  the  well-known  hypothesis,  according  to  which  mergers  can  remove  excess 
capacity and correct faulty internal governance mechanisms (Jensen, 1993), can be 
reviewed in a new perspective. Indeed, these transactions may be more frequent and 
turn out to be more powerful in differing technological contexts. These hypotheses 
suggest  integrating  cross-country  and  cross-sector  analysis  by  focussing  on  the 
specific influence that technological regimes and their innovation patterns may exert in 
reallocating assets and moving capital among sectors.  
To better clarify our intentions to explore the various dimension of takeover activities, 
let us consider two cases: a country and a firm. The country case is that of Germany. 
                                                
3  A  technological  regime  is  identified  by  the  full  set  of  conditions  in  which  innovative 
activities take place (Nelson and Winter, 1982). Recent evolutionary studies have focused on 
relevant aspects of these activities and have made a distinction between two different patterns 
of innovation, originally pointed out by Schumpeter. Henceforth, by ‘technological regimes’, 
we mean the two sectoral models of innovation called SMI and SMII.   4
In  this  economy,  takeovers  and  hostility  are  quite  rare  -  a  common  fact  usually 
explained by specificities of its governance system, where insider protection is higher 
and where corporate governance fosters long-term cooperation and encourages firm-
specific investments by lenders, employees and large shareholders (Schmidt, 2003). 
But Germany, a typical system of ‘patient capitalism’ where enduring relations are 
pervasive, is also a country with a more stable population of innovative firms (Breschi 
et al. 2000) and, in comparison with other European economies, it also “emerges as a 
typical Schumpeter Mark II country” (Malerba and Orsenigo 1996, p.464). This may 
partly explain why Germany has a lower incidence of takeover activities.  
Now let us consider the history of a company, Cisco, during the 1990s: 
Cisco was one of the success stories in the exploding high-technology 
area  of  the  New  Economy.  Cisco  began  by  selling  basic  Internet 
routers to corporate customers. Cisco evolved from a single-product 
company in routers to become a complete data networking solutions 
provider.  What  is  most  relevant  for  our  subject  is  that,  between 
September 21 1993, and October 26 1999, Cisco engaged in more 
than 50 acquisitions. Most of the acquisitions were of relatively small 
size...  Its  acquisition  strategy  was  defined  by  four  main  criteria: 
shared  vision,  beating  competitors  to  the  market,  innovation,  and 
chemistry.  Chemistry  or  culture,  as  explained  by  Michael  Volpi, 
Cisco’s vice President of business development, is of key importance. 
He points out that technology in their industry lasts only 18 months, 
so  continued  innovation  is  a  necessity.”  (Weston,  Mitchell  and 
Mulherin, 2004, p. 104-105). 
 
All the main ingredients to explain the incidence of takeovers are present in the 
Cisco story: the role of a corporate governance system, like that typical of the US, 
with a well-developed stock market that favouring financing of 50 acquisitions, 
mainly of small companies; shackling technology shocks that stimulate a firm to 
become a ‘networking solutions provider’, the specific feature of a sector in which 
technology lasts no more than a year and half! These factors will appear in our 
study, which intends to evaluate on empirical grounds the combined influence that 
alternative technological regimes, different systems of corporate governance and 
industry shocks can play on takeover activities. This will be done by taking into 
account the European experience of the last few years (2002-2005) which seems to 
mark a new wave in M&A activities.  
This comprehensive analysis is another step along the lines suggested by Hall and 
Soskice (2001), two authors who have shown that the industry specialization of 
each country may be seen in its complementarities with its institutional framework.   5
Until now, these complementarities between production regimes and varieties of 
capitalism  have  not  been  fully  explored  in  terms  of the  role  of the market for 
corporate control. The present paper intends to be a first attempt at filling this gap. 
By adopting this integrated perspective, in the following sections we explore in 
which systems and sectors mergers are more frequent and can be expected to play a 
role as remedies to faulty governance and/or represent crucial strategies to exploit 
innovative synergies in entrepreneurial industries.  
The work is organized as follows. Section 2 illustrates the database and clarifies 
some methodological issues of our estimation strategy. Section 3 presents the main 
findings  obtained  by  performing  comparisons  by  countries,  by  sectors  and  by 
technological  regimes.  Section  4  offers  some  conclusions  and  signals  potential 
fruitful lines of research. 
 
2. Data description 
Our  database  of  mergers  and  acquisitions  comes  from  Datastream  and  additional 
information  is  from  Lexis  and  Nexis.  M&A  deals  refer  to  eight  countries,  whose 
activities in the 1990s represented nearly 80% of the European market for corporate 
control
4: Denmark, France, Finland, Germany, Italy, Norway, Sweden and the United 
Kingdom. Data on M&A are collected from “Capital Issues and Changes” Datastream 
reports and only transactions related to takeovers and involving a change in corporate 
control  are  selected.  Completed  and  not  completed  takeovers,  financial  and  non-
financial sectors are included in our database and total 802 deals, for the period 2002-
2005.  
In order to make comparisons of mergers by sectors and to explore the influence of 
differing technological regimes, we aggregated company data at different levels. 
First,  we  aggregated  the  data  into  39  four-digit  sectors  and then into  10 two-digit 
sectors (both classifications are those used by Datastream). These aggregation criteria 
are those provided by the Industry Benchmark Classification (IBC), a system for listed 
companies  managed  by  FTSE  and  Dow  Jones  Indexes  (2004)
5.  Table  A1  in  the 
                                                
4 See Martynova and Renneboog (2006). 
5 IBC has six levels of classification, the lowest is the sub-sector and the highest the whole 
market. Each company is allocated to that sub-sector whose definition most closely describes 
the nature of its business and fits the source of its revenue, or the majority of its revenue. The 
basic sources of information used for the classification are audited accounts and directors’ 
reports. A company which operates in two or more sub-sectors is allocated to that sub-sector 
which provides the largest part of the revenue, as indicated by the latest available reports and 
accounts. A company engaged in three or more sub-sectors that are in two or more industries   6
Appendix shows how the 39 four-digit sectors were converted into the 10 two-digit 
industries. 
In the second step, manufacturing sectors
6 (which form a subset of 26 out of the 39 
four-digit  sectors)  were  classified  and  grouped  into  technological  regimes.  Three 
groups were obtained: i) Schumpeter Mark I (SMI); Schumpeter Mark II (SMII); a 
residual group, termed Other manufacturing. Table 1 shows the mapping classification 
of four-digit sectors into their corresponding technological regimes
7.  
INSERT TABLE 1 
 
In order to clarify how to achieve the mapping classifying shown in Table 1, some 
preliminary  information  is  useful.  First  of  all,  it  is  convenient  to  recall  how  the 
classification into technology regimes was originally obtained (Malerba and Orsenigo, 
1993, 1996). The relevant dimension is innovation activity, and the authors use, as 
proxies,  patent  data  from  the  European  Patent  Office  (EPO)  and  consider  49 
technological  classes.  These  classes  are  created  on  the  basis  of  the  classification 
provided  by  the  International  Patent  Classification  (IPC)  (which  in  turn  relies  on 
specific applications for patents considered by the World International Patent Office 
(WIPO).  
Further  elaborations  result  in  the  classification  into  technological  regimes.  In 
particular, Malerba and Orsenigo (1996) consider four main aspects: i) concentration 
and asymmetries of innovation activity among firms; ii) size of innovating firms; iii) 
evolution over time in the ranking of innovators; iv) comparative importance of new 
innovators with respect to old ones. These four indicators were considered for each of 
                                                                                                                                         
is  classified  in  the  sub-sector  Diversified  Industrials,  which  in  turn  belongs  to  General 
Industrials. 
6 Note, however, that our data, as shown in Table 1, also include some service sectors: i) 
software  and  computer-related  services;  ii)  oil  equipment-related  services;  iii)  support 
services. The first two groups are not separated from manufacturing activities by the IBC used 
here, and must be included in our database; the third group comprises business sectors closely 
related to production.  
7It  must  be  noted  that  in  our  analysis  computer  and  telecommunications  have  been 
distinguished, respectively, into Hardware (SMII) and Software Computer Industry (SMI) and 
Fixed  (SMII)  and  Mobile Telecommunications  (SMI), whereas these distinctions were not 
operated  in  the  original  study  by  Malerba  and  Orsenigo  (1996).  Note,  also,  that  new 
methodological refinements yield for the ICT sectoral system, “a more articulated Schumpeter 
Mark I pattern, in which new innovators do not necessarily generate high turbulence in the 
industry, high innovative entry coexists with a certain level of concentration, and in which a 
variety of sources of knowledge coexists with innovations focused on a few technologies.” 
(Corrocher et al., 2007, p. 429).   7
the 49 classes, so that this analysis maps the classes into two distinct technological 
regimes: SMI and SMII.  
In our context, it is necessary to adopt a mapping classification to convert our 26 four-
digit  sectors  into  the  two  distinct  technological  regimes.  Unfortunately,  official 
guidelines for mapping the IPC and IBC classification systems do not exist. However, 
as stressed by WIPO (2006), in the IPC database “…technical subjects of inventions 
may represent products, processes or apparatus (or the way these are used or applied), 
and these terms should be interpreted in the widest sense…” (p. 22). Similar concerns 
for products or industrial processes are used in IBC, a similarity that favours matching 
between the two systems. Moreover, the patent data used in Malerba and Orsenigo 
(1993,  1996,  1997)  to  obtain  technological  groupings  are  gathered  for  the  same 
countries considered here. In addition, a concordance table similar to that used here 
(Table A2 in the Appendix) was adopted in another study (Van Dijk 2000). This table 
permits  mapping  classification  of  technological classes, technological regimes,  and 
four-digit sectors
8.  
Lastly,  quantitative  information  on  R&D  expenditure  and  innovative  activity  are 
gathered by Eurostat, providing detailed documentation at country level. Concerning 
R&D  expenses,  the  average  values of business enterprise  R&D expenditure in the 
period 2002-2005, as a percentage of GDP, are obtained. Information on innovative 
activity is also drawn from the Fourth Community Innovation Survey (Eurostat) for the 
period  2002-2004,  and  refers  to  the  percentage  of  enterprises  which  introduced 
significant  product  or  process  innovations.  For  both  series  (R&D  expenditure  and 
innovation),  Eurostat  gathers  statistical  information  for  the  NACE  Rev.  1.1 
classification  at  three-digit  level  and  rearranges  the  data  by  establishing  six 
technological  intensity  classes.  Four  classes  refer  to  the  technological  intensity  of 
manufacturing industries, and two to the knowledge intensity of service sectors. Note 
that this statistical information, which does not match our four-digit IBC industries, 
needs  concordance  mapping,  like  that  shown  in  the  Appendix,  Table  A3.  It  was 
constructed by assigning to each four-digit sector a weight proportional to its incidence 
                                                
8Only four-digit IBC sectors and IPC sub-classes are shown in Table A2, but we also processed 
lower levels of disaggregation with the main aim of operating a finer adaptation and of testing 
the matching criterion adopted here. In any case, it is worth noting that we do not actually need 
strict binary correspondence between pairs of classes, because our analysis only focuses on two 
large groups, i.e., the two technological regimes, which embrace almost all the manufacturing 
sectors, thus avoiding strong distortions in reclassification.    8
in  the  respective  Eurostat  technological  intensity  class.  To  sum  up,  the  different 
aggregation levels are shown in Figure 1.  
 




3 The European merger experience for the period 2002-2005: main findings 
A convenient starting point is a comparison of the number of deals obtained in our 
study for the period 2002-2005 with the figures recorded in the previous M&A wave, 
fully explored in Martynova and Renneboog (2006), one the main contributions for the 
European context
9. Table 2 offers some interesting information; in particular, it reveals 
minor changes in the distribution of  M&A  activity between 1993-2001 and 2002-
2005, as shown by the ranking orders (in brackets). The UK is still top, followed at 
some distance by France and Germany. The Italian market for corporate control looks 
more active than in the past, reaching the ranking position that Sweden had occupied 
in the previous years
10. A small increase also affected the share of deals for Denmark. 
INSERT TABLE 2 
 
However, simple standardisation of absolute figures shows some significant reversals 
among countries in rankings by incidence of takeovers. Indeed, Figure 2 offers better 
comparison of geographical patterns: for each country, the absolute number of deals is 
normalized to the total number of firms included in the Datastream database. 
 
                                                
9 Both databases refer to transactions involving changes in corporate control, but in Martynova 
and Renneboog (2006) only domestic and intra-European cross-border deals are taken into 
account, while our data set also include extra-European acquisitions. A different database was 
studied by Jackson and Miyajima (2007), covering M&A deals from the Thomson Banker One 
‘Deals’ over the period 1991-2005; the study examines transactions of substantial stakes of 
publicly listed and private firms of three European countries (France, Germany, UK) and of 
Japan and the US. One of the main findings is “the catching up of M&A in Japan, France and 
Germany”…and “some functional equivalence in promoting corporate restructuring” (Jackson 
and Miyajima, 2007, p. 24). 
10  An  interesting  investigation  of  the  Italian  case,  over  the  period  1991-1994,  has  been 
performed  by  Benfratello  (2001).  The  author,  by  using  the  Italian  and  European  Union 
Competition authorities data, analyzes three different groups of transactions: privatizations, 
acquisition  of  independent  firms  by  foreign  multinationals,  leveraged  and  management 
buyouts. The study examines their respective performances before and after the change in 
control and finds that the latter group performs better than the control sample. 
   9
INSERT FIGURE 2 
 
Additional information is obtained when all transactions are grouped by sectors, and 
can reveal if merger activity clusters significantly in a particular industry: Table 3 
displays the sectoral variation of deals from our Datastream database for the eight 
pooled  countries  for  the  period  2002-2005.  Data  by  target  firms  in  each  two-digit 
industry are collected and volume activity is measured.  
INSERT TABLE 3 
 
 
In terms of percentages of deals out of total number of firms of each sector one obtains 
the results shown by Figure 3. 
 
INSERT FIGURE 3 
Our data clearly confirm that takeovers tend to group in industries and the highest 
performance, in absolute terms, of Consumer Services is worth noting (see Table 3). In 
relative  terms,  we  find  Telecommunication  (see  Figure  3)  as  the  frequency  of 
transactions out of the total number of firms reaches its highest value in this sector, 
almost  ten  points  above  the  average  value  of  the  total  number  of  deals.  For 
Telecommunications, despite the low number of deals involving change of control, 
relatively  speaking,  the  result  is  that  one-fifth  of  companies  were  the  target  of 
takeovers during 2002-2005.
11 Furthermore, merger activity in Telecommunications is 
not a new phenomenon, since a first round of consolidation in the sector occurred in 
the 1990s and was driven by the need to compete with American providers (OECD, 
2001). Thus, a sector classified in the SMII regime on the basis of the 1980s database 
recorded  one  the  highest  incidence  of takeovers  in Europe during the  1990s
12  and 
following  years,  a  striking  finding  that  seems  to  contradict  our  claims.  But  some 
caveats are important.  
                                                
11 Other sources indicate that mergers activities were notable not only in number of deals, but 
also in value: the share market fluctuated from 7% to 11% (Thomson Financial 2002, 2003; 
2004; 2005). Just to name a few cases, let us recall that Olivetti’s acquisition in 2003 of the 
remaining 46% interest in Telecom Italia for $28 billion was by far the largest deal in Europe. 
In the second position we find Telefonica’s planned tender offer for O2 (UK), the second 
largest deal announced for 2005 (Thomson Financial, 2003, 2005). 
12 See Martynova and Renneboog (2006).   10
First of all, the presence of various business segments grouped into a single sector but 
no longer sharing the same features in terms of innovation properties, such as material 
production and telecommunications services, must be taken seriously into account.
13  
These  considerations  suggest  reconsidering  mobile  telecommunication  as  a  sector 
whose innovation activities are similar to those belonging in SMI regime, as examined 
in  recent  studies  (Corrocher  et  al.  2007).  In  any  case,  mobile  and  fixed 
telecommunications exhibit marked differentials. A disaggregated analysis of the three 
top markets for corporate control, Consumer Services (CS), Telecommunications (TC) 
and Utilities (U), at a four-digit sectoral level, is shown in Figure 4. 
 
INSERT FIGURE 4 
 
Some  other  data  qualifications  are  also  important.  In  considering  technological 
regimes, it must be noted that, across countries, not all the different economic sectors 
can be classified in the same technological pattern and country-specific effects may be 
present. Some portions of technological classes, even if they are in the minority, do not 
fall in the same regime in different countries.
14 
Secondly, it must be noted that not only technological reasons may count on merger 
activities.  Market  relatedness  and  organizational  synergies  are  complementary 
explanations that, with technological reasons, may concur to explain merger deals. 
This variety  of motivations is well represented  by some instructive merger stories 
offered from the US, as well as from the European scene. These case studies show that 
telecommunications  are  the  best  example  of  a  sector  in  which  technological 
developments and regulatory changes force and enable firms to found new corporate 
alliances and “to seek new partners across national and technical borders” (Johansson 
and Kang, 2000, p.24). 
                                                
13 It must be added that very often firms diversify their activities, and not all of them may be in 
the same technological regime. In empirical investigations, this problem is solved by simply 
allocating the company to that sector whose definition most closely describes the nature of its 
business;  thus  some  unexpected  relations  between  takeover  activities  and  technological 
regimes are simply the outcomes of diversification, since company mergers may have occurred 
in none prevailing business areas.  
14By classifying technological classes, Malerba and Orsenigo (1996, p. 464-465) find, for a 
panel of six industrialized countries, that only a majority belongs to the same technological 
regime in different countries (34 out of 49 technological classes). Similar results, 18 out of 26 
in a sample of three countries, were obtained by Breschi et al. (2000, p. 399).   11
For instance, our first case study concerns the AT&T and BellSouth deal. This was a 
response to the cable industry to be a ‘triple player’ in communications. Thus, the 
scope  of  the  merger  was  not  only  a  reduction  in  operating  services,  but  also  the 
complementarities that make it possible for a unified corporation to sell a “bundle” of 
services, from fixed, to mobile telephony, to broadband internet and television. The 
acquisition turned out to be successful, and not by chance: it occurred when the two 
companies, AT&T and Bellsouth, had already started to build fast fibre-optic networks 
and had reached well-matching competences and capabilities!
15 
Let us now consider our data and look at a cross-border intra-European deal. Here, the 
story is that of the Spanish Telefonica bid for Britain’s O2 in 2005, and the merger 
represented a potential strategy for entering new markets and selling new products. 
16 
It happened at a crucial moment, when the big incumbent European firms had to face 
two main challenges: a continent-wide wave of consolidation in an enlarged European 
market,  and  product  innovations,  since  mobile  and  wireless  technology  was 
increasingly becoming a substitute for fixed calls. These two main challenges were 
clearly  identified  by  César  Alierta,  Telefonica’s  chairman,  who  explaining  the 
proposed acquisition as “a way of broadening the firm’s reach across different markets 
and technologies”
17.  
Additional  evidence  and  detailed  reports  show  that  “technological  advances  and 
regulatory  reform  are  changing  the  traditional  borders  of  who  is  doing  what  and 
where”. In addition, competition, stimulated by regulatory reform, has meant that “the 
incumbent former monopolies need to respond to customer needs and shareholder 
demands”  (Johansson  and  Kang,  2000,  p.  24).  Mergers  and  acquisitions,  as  well 
corporate alliances, are some of the responses to these structural changes. 
But  some  other  sectors  play  an  active  role  in  the  European  market  for  corporate 
control. Consumer Services and Utilities have been the second and third most active 
markets for corporate control: 18.97% and 14.40% of companies were targets of M&A, 
respectively,  as  Figure  4  shows.  The  growing  importance  of  service  sectors  in 
advanced economies, combined with the success of Information and Communication 
                                                
15 See The Economist, 31/11/2006, issue 8468.  
16  At  the  time  of  the  acquisition,  Telefónica’s  business  sectors  comprised  both  fixed  and 
mobile telephony, while O2 was only active in mobile telephony. Some complementarities 
arose from their respective geographical location, since Telefónica provides its services in 
Spain and the Czech Republic, whereas O2 was active in the UK, Germany and Ireland. 
17 See The Economist, 11/5/2005, Vol. 377, issue 8451.   12
Technologies, the introduction of the Euro, and the interest of manufacturing firms in 
services such as retail and wholesale trade, probably boosted merger activity in these 
industries. Unlike Utilities, deals in Consumer Services were larger in number terms 
(178 was the largest absolute number of deals in industries for the 2002-2005 period) 
but not in value (see Thomson Financial, 2002; 2003; 2004; 2005)
18.  
The basic sources of industry shocks in two of the three sectors displaying a more 
intense change in control (telecommunications and utilities) may be at least partially 
attributed to privatization and liberalization, as already detected for 2000-2001 by the 
European  Commission  (2001)
19.  Thus,  the prediction that  bursts  of  merger activity 
concentrate in industries which are undergoing shocks of significant magnitude seems 
to be confirmed in our database.  
In our analysis, as already mentioned, we group sectors by technological regime. As 
discussed in Section 1, technological regimes may constitute a context in which to 
observe  systematic  differences  in  takeover  frequencies.  In  particular,  the  specific 
knowledge-based  system  characterising  the  SMII  regime,  centred  on  higher 
investments on R&D, may raise structural barriers and limit the market for corporate 
control, an expectation that finds some support from our dataset, as seen below. 
To  conclude,  a  binomial  test  was  performed  to  evaluate  the  significance  of  the 
differences  between  frequencies  of  M&A  by  countries,  by  sectors,  and  by 
technological  regimes.  The  differences  between  frequencies  and  their  statistical 
significance are shown in Table 4.  
INSERT TABLE 4 
 
                                                
18 Manufacturing sectors also played an important role. The relative frequencies of takeovers in 
the sectors of Industrial and Consumer Goods were nearly equal to the average: 12.64% and 
12.34% respectively (see Table 4); in terms of value, Thomson Financial estimated a share 
market ranging from 7% to 11% for Industrial and from 3 to 6% for Consumer Goods, for 
2002-2005. Lastly, it is worth noting that, over the 1990s, a considerable number of deals in 
industries such as plastics, metals, machinery, food, textile, chemicals, was detected by the 
European Commission (2001). In particular, this number has remained more stable during the 
last  decade,  responding  less  to  the  evolution  of  the  economic  cycle,  in  both  upswing  and 
downturn (European Commission, 2001). 
19  As  reported  in  December  2001  by  the  Directorate-General  for  Economic  and  Financial 
Affairs,“…as a consequence of privatization and liberalization, the number of cases in the 
network industries continues to increase steeply, as it has done since 1995. In 2000-2001, post 
and  telecommunications  accounted  for  over  11%  of  all  cases,  while  electricity  and  gas 
accounted for a further 5% (European Commission, 2001, p. 17).   13
As shown by Table 4, differences by countries, sectors and technological regimes exist 
and are statistically significant.  
The positive values of the first column of Table 4 (Panel A) confirm that the UK is the 
most active player in the market for corporate control, and show a positive and significant 
difference (at the 1% level) of the relative incidence of deals with respect to that observed 
in all the other countries of our database (Panel A, column 1). The opposite is obtained for 
Germany (Panel A column 3), where the gap is negative and significant (at the 1% level). 
The results also indicate that, in most cases, the null hypothesis that M&A is uniform 
across sectors can be rejected: inter-industry variations also seem to be confirmed for the 
European experience of the last few years (Panel B). Lastly, the activity of the market for 
corporate  control  in  SMI  sectors  was  significantly  higher  than  in  almost  all  other 
industries classified as SMII sectors (Panel C): the relative frequency of takeovers within 
manufacturing  sectors  included  in  SMI  (13.10%)  is  significantly  higher  than  in  SMII 
(9.77%). 
These results give raise to many questions. For instance, the dispersed ownership structure 
prevailing in the UK, which may require discipline exerted by raiders, can be advocated to 
explain the high incidence of takeovers there. But how to interpret the high incidence of 
takeovers, at least in relative terms, recorded in Italy? Or, conversely, the low number of 
deals in Finland? Why, in the UK, are higher figures recorded in mobile rather than fixed 
telecommunications? How to disentangle the role of deregulation, as happened for utilities, 
from the impact of R&D expenses featuring biotechnologies?  
A further step is to identify some main determinants of M&A and to test their role by 
econometric estimates.  
4. Determinants of merger activities and results 
Frequencies of M&A activities are estimated by considering three dimensions: country 
and institutional variables, sectoral factors and technological regimes. The following 
section  offers  a  brief  discussion  aimed  at  identifying  a  set  of  variables  for  our 
estimates.  
4.1 Country and institutional variables 
A) Wealth  
It is important to control for differences in macroeconomic conditions across countries 
and the first factor to be considered is the country’s wealth, which is proxied by the 
logarithm  of  the  per  capita  GDP.  But,  as  shown  in  Figure  5,  divergences  in 
geographical patterns are only partially explained by considering the GDP weights of   14
each single country
20. Clearly, additional causes are required to explain why some 
countries have a lower number of operations than those expected from the size of their 
economies. Germany, France, and Italy itself are good examples. 
By comparing the economic weight of each country with its M&A activity, the top up 
position of the UK is confirmed (Figure 5). 
INSERT FIGURE 5 
   
B) Ownership and control 
A second factor to be considered is corporate ownership and control. Countries in 
which ownership is heavily concentrated may be involved in very few takeovers, since 
large shareholders have enough incentives and power to exert control over managers; 
they are also in a stronger position to adopt defensive strategies aimed at impeding 
hostile bids. However, the impact that ownership and control structure may exert on 
takeovers  is  controversial,  since  the  benefits  of  large  shareholders  in  facilitating 
takeovers may be significant (Grossman and Hart, 1980; Shleifer and Vishny, 1986). 
Indeed, in a widely held corporation, a serious free-riding problem exists: in a context 
of  dispersed  shareholders,  where  control  is  a  public  good,  internalization  of  the 
benefits of collective action is hindered by the tendency of individual shareholders to 
avoid monitoring costs and take advantage of monitoring activities performed by other 
shareholders  (Grossman  and  Hart,  1980).
21  The  presence  of  a  large  (minority) 
shareholder, not allied with management, provides a partial solution to the Grossman- 
Hart problem, since this owner is able as well as motivated to initiate or favour other 
parties to undertake a takeover deal. Hence, as Shleifer and Vishny (1986) show on 
theoretical and empirical grounds, concentrated ownership and the presence of a large 
shareholder lead to the possibility of overcoming the free-riding problems of dispersed 
possession.  Hence,  a  positive  correlation  between  the  structure  of  ownership  and 
takeovers activity may reasonably be obtained, as in the cross-country comparisons 
performed by Rossi and Volpin (2004). By contrast, following Shleifer and Vishny 
(1997),  it  is  also  possible  to  argue  that  expropriation  activity  by  controlling 
                                                
20 Italy, for instance, has shown an M&A share of 6.4%, while having a 12.7% weight in terms 
of GDP. 
21In fact, ‘if a shareholder thinks that the raid will succeed and that the raider will improve the 
firm, he will not tender his shares, but will instead retain them, because he anticipates a profit 
from  their  price  appreciation’  (Grossman  and  Hart,  1980).  It  must  be  added  that  the 
effectiveness of a market for corporate control is not ensured when competitive conditions are 
not prevailing in product and financial markets, and share prices are not good signals of firm 
performance.  This  implies  that  good  corporate  governance  must  be  accompanied  by  pro-
competition and anti-trust legislation.   15
shareholders, adopting self-dealing strategies at the expense of minority shareholders, 
may discourage investors and obstruct hostile bids. The net balance between opposite 
predictions is ambiguous and must be tested by econometric estimates. 
C) Investor protection  
The relation between concentration and takeover activities may also be the outcome of 
a systematic relation between ownership concentration and legal factors. Indeed, La 
Porta  et  al.  (1998,  1999)  argue  that  better  protection  increases  shareholders’ 
willingness to invest and encourages a more dispersed ownership structure
22. It is only 
by controlling for investor protection that one can disentangle the two effects. The 
problem is ultimately empirical and will be tested with econometric estimates.  
Indeed,  a  cross-country  comparison  explicitly  considering  the  role  of  laws  and 
regulations  offers  complementary  insights.  Investor  protection  laws  and  other 
countries’ regulatory institutions may be crucial determinants explaining why firms 
are owned and financed so differently in different countries, as argued in La Porta et 
al. (1998). The authors make considerable efforts to elaborate accurate indicators for 
shareholders’  rights,  and  have  recently  revised  the  original  index  for  investor 
protection, the so-called anti-director rights, thus offering a new and more accurate 
measure (revised anti-director rights), which better distinguish between enabling rules 
and mandatory or default provisions.
23The revised index is also based on laws and 
regulations updated to May 2003 and is more useful for our purposes.  
In  our  perspective,  one  must  ask  whether  better  legal  rules,  by  improving  the 
functioning of financial markets, end by favouring merger and takeover activities and 
allowing corporate assets to be directed toward their best possible use. Two main 
channels must be considered: i) shareholders’ protection permits liquid stock markets 
                                                
22 A group of papers (La Porta et al. 1997, 1998, 1999), by large cross-sections of countries 
indicators,  show  that  legal  origin  is  correlated  with  the  size  of  stock  markets,  ownership 
concentration and other indicators of financial systems. However, many criticisms have been 
raised  on  this  classification.  Rajan and  Zingales  (2003) show that  the correlation of  legal 
origin and the development of financial markets did not hold at the beginning of the 20
th 
century  and  document  a  ‘great  reversal’  by  historical  trends.  Roe  (2003)  claims  that  the 
correlation between classifications of corporate law and ownership concentration is spurious 
and misleading, since it fails to captures the influence of missing variables. More scepticism 
on  causality  arguments,  between  legal  origin  and  financial  indicators  is  obtained  by 
considering  individual  countries’  experiences  for  Western  and  Eastern  European  countries 
(see, respectively, Becht, 1999, and Pistor, 2004). 
23 The authors also propose new indexes of the strength of minority shareholder protection 
against self-dealing by the controlling block-holder (anti-self-dealing index) for a group of 72 
countries. For a methodological explanation of these new indicators, see Djankov et al. (2008, 
tab. I).   16
and lowers the financial costs of takeovers; ii) it impedes or makes more difficult 
takeover defences adopted by management or other large incumbents. Both effects are 
conducive to a more developed market for corporate control.  
Some  qualifications  must  be  mentioned.  First  of  all,  not  all  measures  affording 
shareholders’  protection  have  a  direct  and  positive  impact  on  takeovers.  Let  us 
consider one of the five provisions concerning voting rights attached to shares. In 
principle, one can argue that “investors may be better protected when dividend rights 
are tightly linked to voting rights” (La Porta 1998, p. 1126). However, deviations from 
the clause ‘one share –one vote’ reduce the number of share transfers necessary to 
obtain a change in control and may make it less difficult to finance takeovers, a well 
known claim advanced by Grossman and Hart (1980) and Harris and Raviv (1988). 
Takeover regulation may be an important determinant of transfers of control, since it 
affects the costs and benefits of these transfers, as extensively analyzed by Bebchuk 
(1994). For instance, when ownership is highly concentrated, a law that allows sharing 
of  the  control premium may tend to align the interest of controlling and minority 
shareholders and thus it prevents value-destroying takeovers which only ensure private 
benefits of control to the dominant block-holder.  
Instead, in widely held firms, legal provision of squeeze-out rights solves free-riding 
problems  caused  by  dispersed  possession.  Indeed,  each  individual  shareholder, 
anticipating that the post-takeover share price will exceed the offered price, prefers not 
to tender. The squeeze-out rule, giving the controlling shareholder the right to force 
minority shareholders to sell their shares, solves free-riding problems and thus allows 
raiders to make value-increasing acquisitions (Burkart and Panunzi, 2004). 
All these and other provisions have been recently harmonized for the European Union 
member  states  by  EU  Directive  2004/25,  and  the  debate  as  to  whether  uniform 
national  legislation  produces  identical  effects  in  countries  with  heterogeneous 
corporate governance regimes is still ongoing (Goergen, Martynova and Renneboog, 
2005). In any case, it should be noted that some of the member states of our database, 
which covers the period 2002-2005, only brought the provisions of the Directive into 
force in 2006, and that the Directive leaves some discretionality to national legislators. 
Thus,  in  a  heterogeneous  legislative  environment  like  that  typical  of  European 
countries, it is convenient the test the role of different takeovers rules on merger deals. 
One explanatory variable of our estimates is thus a synthetic index that captures the 
role of different measures: i) mandatory bid rule; ii) and iii) squeeze-out and sell-out   17
rules;  iv)  ownership  and  control  transparency;  v)  passivity  rule  in  terms  of  board 
neutrality with respect to anti-takeover defences; vi) break- through rule
24 (see Table 
5). 
 
INSERT TABLE 5 
 
It  should  be  noted  that  other  factors,  such  as  enforcement  of  law,  or  accounting 
standards,  are  important  to  our  analysis.  For  instance,  in  Italy  there  is  a  weak 
governance regime, notwithstanding the legal reforms and improvements undertaken 
in  1998,  and  the  quality  of  enforcement  remains  unsatisfactory
25.  Thus,  the  same 
increase in ‘formal’ shareholders’ rights translates into lower effective improvement, 
and one can obtain a lower impact on M&A activities by econometric estimates, as 
shown for the Italian case in Rossi and Volpin (2004, pp. 283-286). Indeed, the index 
for  the  quality  of  the  legal  system,  which  includes  judicial  independence,  the 
impartiality  of  courts,  and  protection  of  intellectual  property  rights  (see  Manchin, 
2004) has the lowest score in Italy (Table 6). 
Additional important determinants are accounting standards that allow information to 
be gathered on potential target firms and ensure greater transparency. Unfortunately, 
the  update  measures  of  this  last  indicator  for  the  eight  countries  selected  in  our 
database are not available, and have been omitted in our estimates. 
Summing  up,  a  wide  spectrum  of  factors,  covering  the  structure  of  ownership, 
shareholders’ rights, the quality of the legal system and takeover regulation may play a 
significant role. Table 6 presents a picture of some of the various indicators for the 
eight European countries selected in our analysis. 
 
INSERT TABLE 6 
 
In Europe, the polarization between two opposite situations (UK and Germany) clearly 
reflects  some  well-known  differences  between  two  distinct  regimes  of  corporate 
                                                
24Additional information on the criteria adopted to obtain the index of takeover regulation 
adopted here is available upon request. 
25 For recent corporate governance reforms in France, Italy and Germany, see Enriques and 
Volpin (2007).   18
governance,  which  a  huge  literature  has  compared  in  many  surveys
26.  Indeed,  as 
recently  reviewed  by  Morck,  Wolfenzon  and  Yeung  (2005),  there  is  a  sharp 
segmentation  between  ownership  patterns  in  continental  Europe  and  in  the  UK
27, 
revealed by comparing the average ownership of the three largest shareholders, as 
shown  by  La  Porta  et  al.  (1998)  for  the  ten  largest  firms  of  each  country
28  (first 
column of Table 6 of this paper). The lower concentration figures are in the UK, while 
the highest in Italy and Germany. Similar results by Faccio and Lang (2002) for a 
different  dataset,  which  included  medium  and  small  financial  and  no-financial 
companies, show that widely held firms have the highest incidence in the UK (63% of 
firms) and the lowest in Germany (10.37%).  
As  well  observed  by  Goergen  and  Renneboog  (2003,  p.  141)  “Not  only  does  the 
concentration  of  control  differ  between  these  countries,  but  so  does  the  nature of 
ownership: Germany is characterized by inter-corporate equity relations and family 
control whereas institutional shareholders hold most of the voting rights in the UK. 
Also, German firms are on average more than 50 years old when they are floated, 
whereas UK IPOs are only 12 years old”
29. Thus, for Germany, often named as an 
‘insider’ system, stable ownership, a strong role for banks and inter-firm relations
30, 
the  active  role  played  by  employees  can  explain  the implementation  of long-term 
relationships and the lesser importance of a market for corporate control.  
However,  Table  6  also  shows  that  European  shareholder  capitalism  is  quite 
heterogeneous,  as  indicated  by  the  dataset  for  concentration,  as  well  as  the 
discrepancy between ownership and control.
31 Confirmation of these heterogeneities 
comes from enforcement of shareholders’ rights. Table 6 shows not only the high 
quality of legal protection afforded in the common law country (UK), but also the 
                                                
26See, among others, Prowse (1995), Maher and Andersson (1999), Allen and Gale (2000), 
Gugler (2001), Becht, Bolton and Roell (2003) and Denis and McConnell (2003). 
27 See the main studies by La Porta et al. (1998), Barca and Becht (2001) and Faccio and Lang 
(2002). 
28 The study by La Porta et al. (1998) refers to a larger dataset which includes 49 countries.  
29 For a comparison between the German stakeholder model and the UK shareholder model, 
see Chilosi and Damiani (2007). 
30 As shown in Prowse (1995), in Germany the percentage of common stocks owned by other 
non-financial enterprises has been estimated at more than 40% of all stocks, with respect to 
only 1% recorded for the UK.  
31 As found by Faccio and Lang (2002), in the Scandinavian countries and Finland the cash 
flow rights of the largest ultimate owners are lower than those observed in Germany, but 
higher than the corresponding figures recorded in the UK. The authors document values of 
30.96, 31.47 and 37.43% for Sweden, Norway and Finland, respectively (Faccio and Lang, 
2002, p. 389).   19
various  scenarios  offered  by  Continental  Europe  where,  for  example,  Italy  and 
Denmark have a different quality of legal systems. In the various cases, ownership 
structures may be predicted to exert a differential impact on the functioning of the 
market for corporate control. We shall see later if these predictions are confirmed by 
econometric estimates.  
 
 
4.2 Sectoral factors 
 
Concerning the sectoral dimension, our aim is twofold: i) to detect the role of industry 
factors on takeover frequencies; ii) to discover their reallocation properties and to test 
the  neoclassical  hypothesis  that  sees  these  transactions  as  efficient  restructuring 
strategies.  
Following  Manne  (1965),  it  is  well  known  that  mergers  and  acquisitions  may  be 
valuable  strategies  that  improve  corporate  governance.  The  reason,  provided  in 
Manne’s seminal paper, is that “...the lower the stock price, relative to what it could be 
with more efficient management, the more attractive the takeover becomes to those 
who  believe  that  they  can  manage  the  company  more  efficiently”  (Manne,  1965, 
p.113). These statements, advanced at firm level, must be considered in a sectoral 
perspective.  
Here, the neoclassical theory of mergers offers a refinement of the original, firm-level 
analysis, and sees these transactions as an efficiency-improving response to various 
industry  shocks.  On  one  hand,  the  basic  hypothesis  is  that  technological  shocks 
occurring at industry level (Jovanovic and Rousseau, 2001, 2002) and antitrust policy 
or deregulation (Mitchell and Mulherin, 1996) cause a high degree of dispersion of the 
firms’ opportunities. The different Q-ratios achieved by the different firms induce the 
acquisition  of  bad  performers  by  more  successful  ones,  thus  promoting  efficient 
selection. Thus, an intense takeover activity signals a capital reallocation faster process 
and  more  efficient  than  that  obtained  by  higher  flows  of  entry  and  exit  of  firms 
(Jovanovic and Rousseau, 2001, 2002). 
On the other hand, however, the managerial literature gives a less optimistic view. As 
explored  at  a  firm  level  of  analysis,  many  disadvantages  may  be  associated  with 
takeovers, since they represent not only an efficient way to correct agency problems,   20
but also manifest agency problems themselves. 
32 An extension of these models at a 
sectoral level must face the hard task of reconciling two stylized and contemporaneous 
facts, not fully consistent with the neoclassical approach: industry merger waves and 
poor profitability for acquirer firms. 
This challenge motivates a second group of models focussing on inefficiencies and 
offering a view dominated by managerial or market failures. Indeed, merger waves 
may be explained by a sort of ‘race for firm size’ adopted by self-interest and rational 
managers who intend to increase the firm’s size and thus reduce the probability of 
acquisitions by other firms (Gorton et al. 2005). Thus ‘eat’ is an escape ‘to be eaten’
33, 
a  value-destroying  strategy  capable  of  explaining  both  merger  clustering  and  low 
returns of bidder firms. But a chain reaction may also be the outcome of hubris (Roll, 
1986)  and  herding,  which  cause  a  propagation  of  errors  and  generate  the  wave 
phenomenon. Hence, in this perspective, rational and less than rational managerial 
strategies  are  conducive  to  inefficiencies  and  misallocation  of  corporate  resources. 
According to this second group of models, one may expect the limited influence of low 
pre-bid share price performance as a determinant of changes in control
34.  
In a different line of research, market failures are considered and a complementary 
hypothesis, advanced by Shleifer and Vishny (2003), considers a scenario dominated 
by rational managers in environments featuring irrational financial markets. Here, the 
dispersion  of  the  ratio  of  market  to  book  values  between  firms  reflects  erroneous 
evaluations by markets, not a real difference in their efficiency. In such circumstances, 
equity prices deviate from fundamental values, as happens in bull markets, and the 
management of over-evaluated firms use their equities to buy the undervalued assets of 
the other ones. On their part, target managers, adopting self-interest and short-term 
strategies, prefer to sell stocks, even when they know their firm will be worth more in 
the long run. Thus, executives reap gains from mispricing, and mergers become “a 
                                                
32 Executives choose to buy target firms in order to increase their power and to divert free cash 
flows (Jensen, 1986), instead of returning it to investors; therefore acquisitions may be used 
for  managerial  empire building (Marris,  1964) or represent  a  diversification  device of the 
managers’  human  capital  risk  (Amihud  and  Lev,  1981).  Other  behavioural  motivations 
grounded on agency problems, such as management entrenchment (Shleifer and Vishny, 1989; 
Edlin and Stiglitz, 1995) imply that executives over-invest in manager-specific projects that 
make it costly for the firm to replace the incumbent manager.  
33“Eat Or Be Eaten: A Theory of Mergers and Merger Waves” is the title of the study by 
Gorton et al. (2005).  
34Shleifer  and  Vishny  (2003)  have  shown  that,  in  bull  market  episodes  characterized  by 
irrational financial markets, the observed dispersion of stock prices between firms does not 
reflect a real difference in their efficiency, but simply erroneous evaluations and mispricings.   21
form of arbitrage by rational managers operating in inefficient markets.” (Shleifer and 
Vishny, 2003, p. 296) 
To summarize, ex-ante low values of the Tobin’s Q of the target firms may be a sign of 
their inefficient management or a manifestation of errors in pricing; in any case it is a 
significant explanatory variable that probably triggers sectoral acquisitions.  
By contrast, under the alternative assumption advanced by the managerial literature 
mentioned above, ex-ante Tobin’s Q market values have a moderate influence, and the 
seriousness of agency costs of acquiring firms may become important
35. Additionally, 
efficiency-related reasons, due to economies of scale or scope, or attempts to create 
market  power,  may  play  some  role,  and  sole  attention  to  industry  shocks  and 
mismanagement has a poor interpretative role. 
According to this brief discussion, and following Mitchell and Mulherin (1996), we 
take into account industry shocks, whatever the various sources underlying them, by 
introducing  abnormal  industry  performances.  Lastly,  for  each  sector  we  added  the 
average values of the ratio of market to book values of target firms.  
 
4.3 Technological regimes  
 
One expected hypothesis of our analysis is that countries and sectoral patterns may 
also  be  explained  by  the  main  differences  that  characterise  sectors  in  terms  of 
innovation processes. Thus the existence of two distinct regimes, the entrepreneurial 
and routinised sectors, may have a significant impact on mergers.  
As already mentioned, the first regime, type of SMI, reveals the lower stability of the 
hierarchy of innovators, a lower concentration ratio of the more innovative firms, and 
a higher proportion of new innovators with respect to the old ones (Audretsch, 1996; 
Dosi, 1988; Malerba and Orsenigo, 1993, 1996).
36 
In this more turbulent environment, mergers and acquisitions are expected to be more 
frequent, and may be an efficient way of growing and obtaining synergies in R&D 
                                                
35 For instance, the evidence obtained for the UK by Franks and Mayer (1996) shows that the 
UK  market  for  corporate  control  “does  not  function  as  a  disciplinary  device  for  poorly 
performing  companies”(Frank  and  Mayer,  1996,  p.180).  Indeed,  the  authors  do  not  find 
significant differentials in terms of performances between acquired and bidder firms. The “free 
cash flow” motivation of bidder management, as well as the entrenched behaviour of target 
management, who resist takeover bids, are they two main drawbacks arising in the market for 
corporate control. 
36  Other  main  references  are  Nelson  and  Winter  (1982),  Kamien  and  Schwartz  (1982), 
Malerba and Orsenigo (1997) and Breschi et al. (2000).   22
expenditure. The opposite may be true for the other, routinezed, regime, SMII. Here, 
innovations  are  incremental  along  existing  technological  trajectories  and  a  less 
frequent reallocation process by acquisitions of other firms may be expected since the 
newly hired workforce has to spend time and effort in order to operate efficiently in 
specialised routines. 
Some  qualifications  are  needed  here,  since  recent  contributions  offer  a  finer 
classification of sectors and suggest the adoption of the broader notion of the sectoral 
system  of  innovations  -  a  different  entity  which  only  partially  overlaps  that  of 
technological  regimes.  Indeed,  according  to  this  multi-dimensional  approach,  more 
attention has been paid to the source of knowledge, degree of application, pervasivity 
of innovations, and finally, the role of actors, not only firms, interacting with each 
other with market and non-market relations
37. An instance is the role of public sector 
organizations,  or  the  various  institutions  that  have  promoted  the  creation  of  new 
protocols  and  favoured  the  adoption  of  standards  and  coordination  in 
telecommunications, as shown in Edquist (2004). Another good example comes from 
a  country  belonging  to  our  database  and  from  the  role  played  by  the  National 
Telecommunication Council, created in Sweden in 1990. Without mentioning other 
paradigmatic cases for a country not present in our database, like the US; here, a 
prominent example is offered by ARPANET, the earliest forerunner of the Internet, 
which originated from public grants by the US Defence Advance Research Project 
Agency (Edquist, 2004). Thus, a further step for future research might be the adoption 
of this more comprehensive approach, more suitable for identifying the proper role 
that various national (public) institutions play in each sectoral system of innovation
38.  
In  the  present  study,  in  any  case,  one  important  point  to  be  explored  is  whether 
innovation activities and R&D processes are driving factors capable of explaining the 
occurrence  of  M&A,  and  whether  potential  synergies  are  conditioned  by  the 
technological regime in which the corporate transaction is operated.  
                                                
37 As Malerba writes, the notion of the sectoral system of innovation “… departs from the 
traditional concept of sector used in industrial economics because it examines other agents in 
addition to firms, it places a lot of emphasis on non market as well as on market interactions, 
and focuses on the processes of transformation of the system…”(Malerba, 2002, p.250). 
38 A second qualification refers to the adoption of technological class, the unit of analysis used 
here to identify patterns of innovations. An improvement on this ground should be represented 
by the adoption of new indicators that better identify the degree of opportunity applications of 
each sectoral system of innovation (Corrocher et al., 2007). For instance, in the ICT field, the 
selection of information from patent abstracts, in terms of recurrence of keywords is useful in 
identifying ICT applications and may reveal a methodological improvement to be extended to 
other sectoral fields.   23
The challenging theme of knowledge and innovation-enhancing strategies represented 
by corporate acquisitions has been the focus of some recent studies. The main intent of 
this  literature  is  to  inquire  if  the  innovation  performance  of  acquiring  firms  is 
influenced  not  only  by  the  technological  base  (measured  in  absolute  and  relative 
terms)  of  the  companies  involved,  but  also  by  the  degree  of  relatedness  of  those 
knowledge bases. An overall evaluation of methodologies and findings in this field of 
research is beyond the scope of the present paper, but it should be noted that the non-
linear impact on the innovation performance of acquisitions emerges: a moderate level 
of relatedness proves superior to high and low levels of relatedness. This result was 
originally  found  for  the  chemicals  industry  by  Ahuja  and  Katila  (2001)  and  later 
extended to other technological sectors by Clodt, Hagedoorn and Van Kranenburg 
(2006). At the same time, Cassiman et al. (2005), Cassiman and Colombo (2006b) 
reported  similar  results  for  a  more  variegate  sectoral  sample:  firms  that  are  in 
complementary technological fields exploit the beneficial effects of mergers, whereas 
the combination of firms that have similar innovation projects is not conducive to 
significant advantages from economies of scale in R&D. 
In our empirical research, more than asking what can happen ex-post, in terms of 
innovation capabilities, we  inquire what ex ante is the actual propensity to merge 
associated  with  various  innovation  regimes.  For  instance,  for  chemicals,  a  sector 
characterized by large firms, continuity in innovative processes, and cumulativeness of 
firms’ capabilities, a lower incidence of M&A is expected.  
Instead, in sectors characterized by creative destruction, R&D processes and efforts are 
probably less serious obstacles for corporate acquisitions. In sum, in our perspective, what 
is explored is the overall question of whether R&D inputs result in the lower probability of 
occurrence  of  M&A  in  environments  of  creative accumulation. Here  innovations  are 
incremental along existing technological trajectory, and for this regime one can expect 
a less frequent reallocation process by acquisitions of other firms, since newly hired 
workforce has to spend time and effort to operate efficiently in specialised routines. 
At  first  glance,  this  expected  hypothesis  seems  to  be  confirmed  by  our dataset, since 
takeovers frequencies are negatively correlated with R&Ds in SMII, while the negative 
association is less significant in SMI.  
 
INSERT FIGURE 6 
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Some final remarks concern the combined role of technology and R&D costs with agency 
costs. In an ex-post perspective, as shown by Hitt et al. (1996), one can verify if some of 
the  potential  synergies  accruing  from  takeovers  are  dissipated  when  top  executives 
consume  energies  in  undertaking  effort-consuming  acquisitions,  or  when  long-term 
investments in innovation are postponed for fear of hostile acquisitions. In our ex-ante 
approach, what is important is to test whether firms (or, rather, their ‘agents’) follow 
an active acquisition strategy as a ‘substitute for internal innovation’ (Hitt et al., 1996, 
p. 1089). More precisely, we intend to ascertain if this substitution mechanism is more 
frequent as the probability of disruption of the established routines falls, thus, mainly 
in business sectors where innovation patterns can be typified as SMI. Indeed, in this 
regime  of  creative  destruction,  where  the  opportunities  for  external  synergies  are 
higher, managers may adopt an acquisition strategy as a sort of ‘short cut’ to allow 
them to be free riders of innovation efforts undertaken by target firms. After all, for a 
given level of managerial failures spreading across various countries, it is perhaps not 
by chance that, in more than 800 deals found in our database, takeovers only involve 
five chemical firms
39!  
This finding, apparently, seems to conflict with other evidence that shows, in a long-
term perspective, that even the chemical industry has solved its overcapacity problems, 
suffering, for instance, during the interwar period, both with mergers and acquisition, 
as well as with corporate alliances, such as the nitrogen cartel between IG Farbel and 
ICI. These were not unique events but phenomena which were repeated in the 1980s, 
whenever acquisitions, and therefore greater market shares, allowed a balance between 
slower demand growth and a decline in profits (Cesaroni et al. 2004, pp. 131-132). But 
what is still remarkable is that, in a sector designed as SMII, such as the chemical 
industry, these corporate deals occurred in situations of diminishing opportunities for 
product innovation, not in phases of technological change and innovation. This is one 





                                                
39 Interesting insights are obtained by considering two of these five deals: the cases of Degussa 
in Germany and the British transaction targeting British Vita.   25
4.4 Estimates 
 
In  this  section  we  evaluate  the  volume  of  M&A  activity  and  the  determinants  of 
various patterns observed by countries and by sectors. Table 7 shows the results of our 
regressions on the determinants of takeover activity. 
The dependent variable is the percentage of companies, included in the Datastream 
database, that are targets of mergers or acquisitions in each country and in each four-
digit sector for the whole period 2002-2005
40 (see Section 2 and Table A5 in the 
Appendix, for a description of dependent and explanatory variables). 
Note that the dependent variable in our regressions is merger intensity (frequencies of 
industry-country deals) and that, for this variable, we have encountered the problem 
that there were no mergers in many industry-countries. In fact, the maximum number 
of observations is 312 (39 four-digit sectors times 8 countries), but our database does 
not contain companies in all 312 sector-countries but only in 286 sector-countries; 
furthermore, mergers and acquisition deals do not occur in all sectors. Indeed, our 
market  for  corporate  control  (completed  and  not  completed  deals  occurring  in  the 
period  2002-2005)  concerns  only  175  country-four  digit  sectors.  Moreover,  for 
country-sectors not observed data, the regressors are also lost and we have a typical 
truncated  data  problem  (some  observations  on  both  dependent  and  independent 
variables are lost). 
Assuming that the dependent variable yi is a continuous random variable and that xi is 
the vector of regressors, we randomly draw (xi, yi) from a sample of 286 four-digit 
sectors. The selection rule consequently takes the following form:  
si=1[yi >0],  where 0 is the truncation point 
If yi >0 we observe both yi and xi; if yi = 0, we do not observe either yi or xi. and we 
have  a  truncated  random  variable  model.  It  is  known  (see  Wooldrige,  2001,  and 
Greene 2003), that in this case ordinary least squares (OLS) estimates are inconsistent. 
We estimate the parameters of the truncated regression model by applying a maximum 
likelihood estimation method
41. 
The estimated model is the following: 
                                                
40 Unfortunately, we do not have variables structured in panel data because the number of 
sectors in which M&A occur changes from one year to another. For this reason, we carried out 
a cross-section analysis on pooled data for the period 2002-2005. 
41 All estimates were performed with the STATA9 package. The dataset and routines used are 
available upon request. 
































i=1,…8  Countries 
j=1,…39  Four-digit Sectors 
m=1,…5  Institutional variables (I) 
n=1,2    Sectoral variables (S) 
l=1,2    Technological variables (TEC) 
z=1,2    Technological Regimes dummy variables (TR) 
 
Table 7 presents results for three different set of estimates, which test, respectively, the 
role of institutional, sectoral and technological factors. 
The first three columns (columns a, b, c) include country variables and permit to 
control  for  differences  in  institutional  conditions.  More  precisely,  the  main 
independent  variables  are  the  economic  wealth  of  each  country,  ownership 
concentration, takeover regulation, and other legal factors. In details, the first country 
variable is captured by GDP per capita, whereas two different indices are considered 
for ownership concentration: the average equity stake held in each country by the three 
largest owners (column a), and the percentage of firms widely held (column b). Legal 
variables and investor protection are represented by takeover regulation (column a and 
b), or by anti-director rights (column c), updated to 2003 and revised by Djankov et al. 
(2008). We have also included in each specification the market to book values of 
targets,  to  capture  efficiency  potential  improvements.  All  the  specifications  are 
augmented sectoral dummies introduced to capture the role of specific industry effects.  
Another estimate (column d) tests also the role of sectoral reallocations triggered by 
industry  shocks.  This  effect  may  be  captured  by  deviations  between  a  particular 
industry’s  added  value  growth  with  respect  to  the  average  values  across  all  39 
industries.  
The third set of estimates, columns e, f, g, h, evaluates also the role of innovation and 
technological  regimes.  We  tested  the  null  hypothesis  that  R&D  and  innovation 
activities, and their differential patterns, do not play an autonomous role in merger 
deals. The sectoral volume of R&D expenses, standardized to value added (column e), 
and the incidence of innovation (column g) are firstly included as total aggregate, not 
differentiated by technological regimes. The other estimates (respectively, columns f 
and h) include the same variables, differentiated into the two regimes.   27
Table 7 reports the coefficients obtained with truncated regressions.  
 
INSERT TABLE 7 
 
Our econometric estimates confirm the importance of institutional and country-level 
factors as significant determinants of mergers and acquisitions and extend some of the 
conclusions, already reached for the 1990s by Rossi and Volpin (2004), in the last few 
years.  
First,  the  statistical  significance  of  both  the  coefficients  of  ownership  structure, 
measured  by  the  two  different  indices  included  in  the  specifications,  support  the 
prediction that concentration helps to alleviate the free-riding problems that impede 
takeovers  in  cases  of  fragmented  ownership  rights.  This  finding,  obtained  when 
shareholder protection variables are included, confirms that ownership may exert an 
autonomous  and  direct  impact,  not  simply  due  to  its  ‘endogenous’  and  legally 
determined  nature.  Thus,  by  disentangling  the  effects  of  ownership  and  investor 
protection, clearer results are obtained. 
Second, our estimates show that efficient regulation aimed at facilitating these deals 
and at reducing takeover defences is correlated with a more active market for mergers 
and  acquisitions.  By  contrast,  legal  shareholder  protection,  measured  by  the  anti-
director rights index, updated and revised by Djankov et al. (2008), does not seem to be 
significant  (column  c).  Hence,  the  hypothesis  that  better  investor  protection  is 
correlated with a more active market for mergers and acquisitions, as reported by Rossi 
and Volpin (2004), does not find clear confirmation for the last few years, even when 
the new updated index is used.
42 
Additional  estimates  show  that  industry  changes  have  an  influence  in  explaining 
takeovers when we control for R&D expenses. This finding suggests that mergers are 
not  an  unequivocal  response  to  technological  or  regulatory  shocks  occurring  at 
industry level which promote massive reallocation of resources.  
                                                
42In our estimates, the role of anti-director rights is not significant, even when the updated (not 
revised)  index  is  introduced;  no  significant  results  are  also  obtained  when  this  indicator 
(revised or not) is weighted with the quality of the legal system. In addition, legal families, and 
the presumed associated features on qualities of legal institutions, do not play a significant role 
on the volume of M&A. All these results, not reported in Table 7 for reasons of space, are 
available upon request.    28
Although these findings encourage us to be confident in the role of institutional model, 
they represent a further incentive to deepen analysis of the role played by sectoral 
dimension.  
Note that all our estimates confirm the role of the sectoral values of Tobins’ Q: the ex-
ante  Q  values  of  the  target  firms,  as  shown  in  Table  7,  are  always  statistically 
significant. This is a robust finding, and the proxy for Tobin’s Q, included in all the 
specifications  reported  in  the  table,  significantly  improves  the  goodness  of  fit. 
However, explaining this finding is controversial and difficult. As already mentioned, 
one  plausible  interpretation,  according  to  agency  theory,  is  the  ‘underperformance 
hypothesis’, according to which sectors that exhibit low market valuations relative to 
real assets also record higher frequencies of acquisitions. If these takeovers are aimed 
at  restructuring  poorly  performing  firms,  the  result,  as  claimed  by  Jovanovic  and 
Rousseau (2002, p.198), is that “mergers are a channel thorough which capital flows to 
better projects and better management.” Instead, we cannot discard the hypothesis that 
low sectoral values reflect not poor performances, but erroneous market evaluations, 
along the lines suggested by Shleifer and Vishny (2003). Further study, considering 
alternative  performance  indicators,  independent  of  stock  market  valuations,  and 
properly selecting and filtering out firm-level and industry-wide causes, should make 
our  interpretations  more  convincing.  Similar  improvements  could  be  obtained  by 
considering  acquirer  as  well  as  target  performances,  and  by  introducing  additional 
explanatory  variables  to  specify  the  different  role  of  cash  or  equities  methods  of 
payments, since the mispricing hypothesis of Shleifer and Vishny (2003) only explains 
acquisitions with (overvalued) stocks. 
The last set of estimates seems to reject the null hypothesis that R&D costs and the 
incidence of innovators play the same role on M&A, irrespective of the sectors in 
which  they  are  actually  spent.  The  polarization  of  sectors  into  two  distinct 
technological regimes may also exert an autonomous and significant impact on merger 
deals.  
One related implication is that the maintained hypothesis of a vast body of literature, 
according to which “the takeover route is often the least-cost method to alter industry 
structure” (Mitchell and Mulherin, 1996, p. 196) must be reconsidered and partially 
revised.  Indeed,  both  the  functions  performed  by  merger  activity
43,  ‘contraction’ 
                                                
43 See the detailed analysis of Andrade and Stafford (2004), who explore the distinct roles of 
takeovers in terms of expansion and contraction. The authors illustrate how the contractionary   29
(downsizing driven by negative industry shocks and excess capacity) and ‘expansion’ 
(increase  in  firm  size  triggered  by  positive  shocks  and  alternative  to  internal 
investments)  may  produce  differential  benefits  when  technological  and  innovation 
processes  are  taken  into  account
44.  A  further  investigation  of  these  issues  seems 
appreciable at a time of intense debate on the role of mergers and when some authors 
(Foster  et  al.,  2002,  Blanchard,  2006)  claim  that  most  of  the  productivity  gains 
obtained in the American economy (in some sectors more than 90%) were due to 
inter-firm reallocation, rather than efficiency improvements with a given firm. The 
European economies, which still have to remove obstacles that impede takeovers, also 
have to discover in which sectoral fields of specialization merger activity produces 





By  studying  deals in eight European countries, we find that integrated analysis is 
useful in explaining takeover activity, and some main conclusions can be reached: 
country characteristics are important; ownership and regulation may influence country 
patterns; firm market valuations, and thus pre-bid performances between target and 
acquired  companies,  are  significant  all  over  sectors;  technological  regimes  are 
important. 
Indeed, evaluation of a wide range of institutional country variables clearly indicates 
that  ownership  concentration  is  not  a  real  impediment  to  takeovers,  since  some, 
perhaps friendly, acquisitions may occur even in countries where block-holders are 
present, but where the overall quality of institutions are not conducive to those failures 
represented by private benefits of control. The Nordic countries are good examples.  
In  addition,  evaluation  of  some  other  institutional  country  variables  shows  the 
significant role of takeover regulation, whereas investor protection has a lower impact, 
one result which is still controversial. Future research would gain by the availability of 
updated  alternative  institutional  variables;  for  instance,  updating  of  accounting 
standards  by  countries  could  improve  analysis,  since  these  variables,  by  allowing 
                                                                                                                                         
role  in  the  US  was  restricted  to  the  1970s  and  1980s,  whereas  expansionary  waves  were 
typical of the 1990s.  
44  Not  by  chance,  two  typical  examples  of  contraction  and  expansion  waves,  reported  by 
Mitchell and Mulherin (1996), to be the steel industry and the banking sector, both refer to a 
regime not marked as SMII.   30
information to be gathered on potential target firms, would ensure more transparency, 
reduce  expropriations  by  large  incumbents  and  make  the  adoption  of  takeover 
defences more difficult.  
In any case, one robust finding is the role of pre-bid performances: the pre-bid Tobin’s 
Q  of  target firms is a  driving force, since it exerts a significant impact in all our 
estimates. Monitoring functions or erroneous market evaluations? Efficient deals or 
hubris and managerial self-interest strategies? These are matters for further research, in 
which  additional  evidence  on  post  takeover  restructuring  processes  should  help  to 
discriminate between the opposite hypotheses of correction of managerial failures, on 
one hand, and redeployment of assets, on the other.  
Lastly,  our  estimates  suggest  that  barriers  to  takeover  activities  are  not  only 
represented by institutional impediments, but may have an alternative and structural 
explanation: the regime which qualifies the innovation process.  
Two  sectoral  patterns  of  innovation  were  observed,  and  our  findings  show  their 
differential  behaviour  in  terms  of  takeover  activity.  In  the  first,  characterized  by 
creative destruction, where the ranking orders of innovators are unstable and entry 
rates of innovators are high, takeovers are more frequent, since innovation follows a 
widening pattern. In the second, featuring creative accumulation and the stability of a 
core of leading innovators, external acquisitions are less frequent, since they represent 
a break in the continuity of deepening innovation processes. Thus, even in countries 
where transfer of control is a frequent phenomenon, we found that mergers in those 
sectors where innovation is a cumulative process are less frequent. In these sectors, 
takeovers may be a threat, not only to bad management, but also to the continuity of 
accumulation of innovative capabilities. In these cases, higher investments in R&D 
may represent an intrinsic obstacle limiting merger activities and thus impeding the 
destruction  of  deepening  patterns  of  innovation.  Hence,  takeovers  do  not  always 
represent, for all sectors, the main mechanism for reducing corporate inefficiencies 
and mitigating agency costs. The evidence collected for the UK, which is the most 
active market for corporate control and where 80% of mergers involve sectors not 
marked as SMII, is significant. It confirms that a comprehensive framework, where 
complementarities between institutional settings and industrial fields of specialization 
are  taken  into  account,  is  useful  for  better  understanding  of  those  varieties  of 
capitalism observed around the world.   31
However, in this multi-dimensional perspective, further steps should be taken and a 
careful examination of post-takeover performances should be empirically undertaken. 
More  precisely,  two  additional  questions  should  be  posed:  in  which  corporate 
governance system does merger activity improve shareholder return rather than private 
managerial benefits? in which technological regime does it turn out to be a profitable 
strategy? The first question has animated the value creation and value destruction 
debate on takeovers
45. The second one has never been asked.  
It is undeniable that recent studies report that “the corporate takeover market acts as a 
court of last resort, that is, it is an external source of discipline applied when internal 
control mechanisms are relatively weak or ineffective.”(Kini et al. 2004) This means 
that  hostile  takeovers  do  not  always  represent  the  main  mechanism  capable  of 
reducing corporate inefficiencies and mitigating agency costs. What is left to discover 
is that this court of last resort is even less desirable when it represents not only a 
‘breach of trust’ but also a ‘breach of knowledge’. 
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TABLES 
 
Table 1: Technological Regimes and Industries 
SMI  SMII  Other 
Manufacturing 
Food producers  Aerospace & Defence  Mining 
Beverages  Oil and Gas Producers  Forestry & Paper 
Tobacco  Oil Equipment & Services  General Industrials 
Household Goods  Chemicals  Automobiles & Parts 
Personal Goods  Pharmaceuticals, Biotechnology  Support Services 
Construction & Materials  Healthcare Equipment   
Industrial Engineering  Electronic, Electrical Equip.   
Industrial Metals  Fixed Line Telecommunications   
Industrial Transportation  Technology Hardware & Equip.   
Leisure Goods     
Mobile Telecommunications     
Software & Computer Services     
 
Source: Our elaborations from FTSE and Dow Jones Indexes (2004) and from Malerba 
and Orsenigo (1996). 
 
Table 2: Mergers and Acquisitions by target country in eight European countries, 1993-
2005 
  1993-2001  2002-2005 
Countries  Number M&A    % M&A  Number M&A  % M&A 
United Kingdom  932  47.53 (1)  475  59.23 (1) 
France  308  15.71 (2)  106  13.22 (2) 
Germany  269  13.72 (3)  57  7.11  (3) 
Sweden  150  7.65   (4)  43  5.36  (5) 
Norway  95  4.84   (5)  40  4.99  (6) 
Italy  83  4.23   (6)  45  5.61 (4) 
Finland  73  3.72   (7)  11  1.37  (8) 
Denmark  51  2.60   (8)  25  3.12  (7) 
Total  1,961  100.00  802  100.00 
Sources: 1993-2001 Thomson Financial, SDC, see Martynova and Renneboog (2006); 2002-
2005,  our  elaborations  on  Datastream  and  Lexis-Nexis  database;  the  ranking  order  of  the 
frequencies is shown in parenthesis. 
 
Table 3: M&A activity by sectors in eight European countries, 2002-2005 
Sectors  Number of 
target firms 
Number of total 
firms 
% of  
target firms 
Oil & Gas (O&G)  19  154   12.33 
Basic Materials (BM)  31  318  9.75 
Industrials (I)  168  1,329  12.64 
Consumer Goods (CG)  89  721  12.34 
Healthcare (H)  40  358  11.17 
Consumer Services (CS)  178  938  18.97 
Telecomm.(TC)   21  98  21.43 
Utilities (U)  18  125  14.40 
Financial (F)  152  1,481  10.26 
Technology (T)  86  876  9.82 
Total  802  6,398  12.54 
Source: our elaborations on Datastream database   39
Table 4: Results of Binomial Tests for differences between relative frequencies of M&A 
Panel A-Differences between relative frequencies of M&A by countries 
  UK  FR  GE  IT  SW  DK  NW 
UK               
FR  7.14***             
GE  12.88***  5.74***           
IT  3.05***  -4.09*  -9.83***         
SW  7.61***  0.47  -5.27***  4.56***       
DK  4.97***  -2.17***  -7.91***  1.92  -2.64     
NW  4.89***  -2.25**  -7.99***  1.84  -2.72*  -0.08   
FN  9.88***  2.74***  -3.00***  6.84***  2.28*  4.92**  4.99*** 
Panel B- Difference between frequencies of M&A by two-digit sectors 
  O&G  BM  I  CG  H  CS  TC  U  F 
O&G                   
BM  1,94                 
I  -0,80  -2,74               
CG  -0,65  -2,59  0,15             
H  0,51  -1,42  1,32  1,17           
CS  -7,18**  -9,12***  -6,38***  -6,53***  -7,70***         
TC  -9,74***  -11,68***  -8,938***  -9,08***  -10,26***  -2,56**       
U  -3,51  -5,45***  -2,71***  -2,86**  -4,03**  3,67***  6,23*     
F  1,21  -0,7245  2,02**  1,87  0,70  8,40***  10,96***  4,73*   
T  1,87  -0,0689  2,68***  2,53**  1,35  9,05***  11,61***  5,38**  0,65 
Panel C- Difference between frequencies of M&A by Technological Regimes 
Tehnological Regimes  No. Target firms  No. Total Firms  % target firms 
SMI   264  2,015  13.10 
SMII   109  1,116  9.77 
Difference SMI - SMII      3.33*** 















Sell out rule 
(% of stocks) 
(c) 
Transparency 








UK  30  90  90  3  no  yes 
FR  33.33  95  95  5  no  yes 
GE  30  95  95  5  no  yes 
IT  30  98  90  2  yes  yes 
SW  40  90  90  5  no  yes 
DK  33.33  90  90  5  no  yes 
NW  40  90  90  5  no  yes 
FN  66.67  90  90  5  no  yes 
Legenda: a) percentage of shares that makes compulsory the tender offer to all the shareholders; b) 
percentage of equities that gives the controlling shareholder the right to force the minority shareholders 
to sell their shares; c) the threshold above which the remaining shareholders have the right to sell their 
shares at a fair price; d) the threshold above which the ownership of voting rights have to disclosed; e) 
the rule that permits a bidder to break through the existing voting arrangement and to exercise control as 
in a context of one share-one vote; f) the rule that requires board neutrality in case of anti-takeovers 
measures and that make compulsory the approval by the shareholders meeting. See Appendix, Table A4 
for legislative sources. 
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Table 6: Ownership, shareholders protection and legal systems in eight European countries  










Legal system   Takeover 
regulation 
United Kingdom  0.19  63.08  5.0  8.80  5 
France  0.34  14.00  3.5  7.66  2 
Germany  0.48  10.37  3.5  8.95  2 
Italy  0.58  12.98  2.0  7.10  5 
Sweden  0.28  39.18  3.5  8.78  3 
Denmark  0.45  -  4.0  9.08  4 
Norway  0.36  36.77  3.5  8.86  3 
Finland  0.37  28.68  3.5  9.16  3 
Average  0.38  29.30  3.56  8.55  3.37 
Legenda: Ownership concentration: The average percentage of common shares owned by three largest 
shareholders  in  the  10  largest  non  financial,  privately  owned  domestic  firms  of  a  given  country 
(Djankov et al. 2008 Tab. XIII and La Porta et al. 1998, Tab.7); Widely held firms: percentage of 
companies that do not have shareholder controlling, at least 20% of votes, in a sample of 5,232 publicly 
traded financial and non financial corporations (Faccio and Lang 2002, Tab. 3); Anti-director rights: the 
revised index by Djankov et al. (2008); this index measures the quality of the legal system and takes 
into account judicial independence, impartiality of courts, protection of intellectual property, military 
interference  in  the  rule  of  law  and  integrity  of  the  legal  system  (see  Manchin,  2004);  takeover 
regulation: the index is obtained from Table 5 and it scores from 1 to 6. Higher values correspond to a 
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0.717***  0.780***  0.200  0.679***  0.700***  0.663***  0.650***  0.608*** 
  (0.185)  (0.251)  (0.151)  (0.172)  (0.161)  (0.151)  (0.133)  (0.146 ) 
Concentrated 
Ownership 
0.547**    0.394  0.570**  0.526**  0.439**  0.500***  0.507** 
  (0.236)    (0.455)  (0.228)  (0.215)  (0.214)  (0.197)  (0.210) 
Widely held firms    -0.005**             
    (0.002)             
Takeover regulation  0.121***  0.162***    0.114***  0.111***  0.104***  0.101***  0.100*** 
  (0.030)  (0.049)    (0.027)  (0.025)  (0.024)  (0.021)  ( 0.023) 
Antidirector Rights 
(index revised) 
    -0.009           
      (0.061)           
Market to Book 
value of Equity 
(PBR) 
-0.028***  -0.033***  -0.035***  -0.029**  -0.025**  -0.022**  -0.017*  -0.023** 
  (0.012)  (0.012)  (0.013)  (0.012)  (0.012)  (0.013)  (0.010)  (0.011) 
Shock in the 
sectoral growth rate 
      0.011  0.012*  0.013**  0.008  0.009 
        (0.007)  (0.007)  (0.006)  (0.006)  (0.006) 
R&D          -0.441*       
          (0.260)       
R&D *SMI            -0.340 
 
   
            (0.309)     
R&D *SMII            -10.472***     
            (2.940)     
Innovation              -0.017***   
              (0.006)   
Innovation * SMI                -0.010* 
                (0.006) 
Innovation* SMII                -0.102*** 
                (0.029) 



















  (0.736)  (0.973)  (0.655)  (0.670)  (0.627)  (0.587)  (0.522)  (0.570) 
Chi2 Test 
(Prob>Chi2) 
0.0112  0.0114  0.130  0.009  0.002  0.001  0.000  0.001 
***Significant at the 1 % level; ** Significant at the 5 % level; * significant at the 10 % level. 
Robust standard errors are reported in parentheses. Note that the number of observations of 
estimates reported in column b is only 162 since the indicator for widely held firms, introduced 
in the specification, is not available for Denmark.    42
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Figure 2: The geographical patterns of the market for corporate control in 
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Figure 3: M&A activity in eight European countries: incidence of 
takeovers by two digit sectors 

































Source: our elaborations on Datastream database 
 
Figure 4: The top markets for corporate control in eight European 
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Figure 5: Distribution of M&A activity and GDP weights in eight 















Source: our elaborations on DataStream database 
 
Figure 6: Incidence of M&A and R&D in eight European countries (2002-2005): 
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Source: our elaborations on DataStream database; 
a the correlation coefficient, calculated 
by excluding outliers, is significant at the 10% level. 
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Figure 7: Incidence of M&A and R&D in eight European countries (2002-2005):SMI 
sectors (Correlation coefficient =-0.14
 a) 
 
Source : our elaborations on DataStream database: 
a the correlation coefficient, calculated 
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APPENDIX 
Table A1: IBC two-digit and four-digit sectors    
Two-digit sectors  Four-digit sectors   Two-digit sectors   Four-digit sectors  
Oil and Gas Producers   
Oil & Gas 
Oil Equipment & Services  Media 
Chemicals  Travel & Leisure 





Forestry & Paper      




Aerospace & Defence      
Electronic, Electrical Equip.  Electricity 
Industrial Engineering 
Utilities 
Gas, Water & Multi-utilities 
Support Services      
Industrials 
General Industrials  Banks 
Food producers  Equity Investment Instruments 
Beverages  General Financials 
Tobacco  Life Insurance 
Household Goods  Non equity Invest. Instruments 





Automobiles & Parts      




Software & Computer Services 
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Four digit sectors 
(IBC)  Technological Classes (IPC) 
Food producers  (4) Agriculture 
Beverages  (16) Chemical Processes for Food and Tobacco 
Tobacco  (4) Chemical, Analytical and Physical Processes 
Household Goods  (3) Furniture; (34)Household Electric appliance;  
Personal Goods  (2) Clothing and Shoes; (14) Medical Preparations 
Construction & 
Materials  (30) Civil Engineering and Infrastructure 
Industrial 
Engineering 
(29) Material Handling Apparatus; (24) Industrial 
Machinery and Equipment; (32) Mechanical Engineering; 
(35) Lighting Systems; (33) Mechanical and Electric 
Technologies; (36) Measurement and control Instruments; 
(23) Industrial Automation 
Industrial Metals  (22) Machine Tools 
Industrial 
Transportation  (28) Railways and Ships 
























Computer Services   
Aerospace & 
Defence 
(27) Aircraft; (47) Ammunition and Weapons; (48) Nuclear 
Technology 
Oil and Gas 
Producers  (6) Gas, Hydrocarbons and Oil 
Oil Equipment & 
Services  (31) Engines, Turbines and pumps 
Chemicals  (8) Organic Chemicals; (9) Macromolecular Compounds 
Pharmaceuticals, 
Biotechnology  (12) Biochemical, Bio and Genetic Engineering 
Healthcare 
Equipment  (37) Laser Technology; (38) Optics and Photography 
Electronic, 

























Hardware & Equip.  (39) Computers; (40) Other Office Equipment 
Mining  (5) Mining 
Automobiles & 
Parts  (26)Vehicles, Motorcycles 



















 Forestry & Paper   
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Table A3 Classification of four-digit sectors by technological intensity 
and knowledge 
Manufacturing sectors and technological intensity 
Hi- Tech  Medium Hi-Tech  Medium Low-
Tech  Low-Tech 





















Materials  Tobacco 
Technology Hardware 
& Equipement      Household 
Goods 





Service sectors and knowledge 
High Knowledge  Low Knowledge 
 
Software & Computer Services  Media 
Support Services  Travel & Leisure 
Oil Equipment & Services  Food & Drug Retailers 
Banks  General Retailers 
Equity Investment Instruments  Electricity 
General Financials  Gas, Water & Multi utilities 
Life Insurance   
No- equity Invest. Instruments   
Non Life Insurance   
Real Estate   
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Table A4: Sources for takeover regulation  
UK  The Panel on Takeovers and Mergers (2002), The Takeover Code 
Sweden   The Swedish Financial Supervisory Authority’s Regulations Governing Rules 
of Conduct on the Securities Market (2002) 
Tude B., “Swedish Securities Council Issues Statement on Mandatory Bids”, 
International Financial Law Review, 2000 
Finland  Himonas D., “The Financial Supervision Authority Imposes New Guidelines”, 
International Financial Law Review, 2000 
Securities Market Act 26.5.1989/495 
Norway  Act on Securities Trading, Act no. 79 , 19th June 1997 
Germany  Roos M. – Cornett C. (2002), Takeover season in Germany, AltAssets 
Schmid F.A. – Wahrenburg M. (2002), Mergers and Acquisition in Germany, 
The Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis, Working Paper Series 2002- 027A 
France  Décret n. 2003-1109 du 21 Novembre 2003 Relatif à l'Autorité des Marchés 
Financiers 
Règlement général de l’Autorité des marchés financiers, 2006 
Italy   Testo Unico Finanziario, Decreto Legislativo 24 febbraio 1998, n. 58 , “Testo 
unico delle Disposizioni in Materia di Intermediazione Finanziaria, ai sensi 
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Table A5: Description of variables included in our estimates and their sources 




Percentage of traded firms at sectoral level in the period 2002-2005 that have been targets 
of completed and not completed M&A.  
Source: Datastream. 
  Regressors:   
Concentrated 
Ownership  
The average percentage of common shares owned by three largest shareholders in the 10 
largest non financial, privately owned domestic firms of a given country. Source: La Porta 




Percentage of companies that do not have shareholder controlling at least 20% of votes. 
Source: Faccio and Lang (2002) 
Takeover 
regulation  
Index  that captures  the role of  different  measures  that favours takeovers (see Table 5 






The index for shareholder rights, that updates and corrects the original measure of La 














































The logarithm of per-capita GDP, proxy for the countries’ wealth. Source: Eurostat. 




The  deviation  of  value  added  of  each  four-digit  sector  from  the  annual  average  GDP 

























book value  
of equity 
Average sectoral level of company’s Price to Book Ratio for the 3 years before the deal. 






































Percentage of firms at sectoral level that undertake innovative activities.  
Source: Eurostat, Fourth Community Innovation Survey.  
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